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1 |  INTRODUCTION
The year of 2019 was to mark the 20th anniversary of the European single currency (the euro) and the 
expected exit of the United Kingdom, known as Brexit, from the European Union. It is then appropri-
ate to ask what will be the impact of Brexit on the stability of the euro area? Does Brexit undermine 
the euro because it undermines the EU as a political and economic project, or will it allow the rest 
of the EU to implement institutional changes that will help the euro work better? These are difficult 
and pressing questions. The contribution of this paper is to provide some of the key elements for an 
informed debate.
Regarding the stability of the euro area, a measure of how widely recognised are the current short-
comings of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU) is the Brussels’ plan for a Genuine EMU (Begg, 
2014).1 Agreement on the need for a solution coexists with an apparently stark disagreement on the 
causes. One view is that "design flaws" (De Grauwe, 2006; De la Dehesa, 2012) deepened imbalances, 
while another is that "policy mistakes" (Sandbu, 2015) hindered convergence. One of the many pro-
posed solutions is a flexible euro (Stiglitz, 2016): a two-tier model of a Northern and a Southern euro 
where the latter is said to be "softer." One way to explain such proposals is that the Southern euro 
would not be part of the "core" or that it would be "less core." All these views, however, rely upon 
"asymmetries": the less asymmetric, the more synchronised, the more stable will the euro area be.
Regarding Brexit, in June 2016, 52% of British voters decided that being the first country ever to 
leave the EU was a price worth paying despite extensive advice from economists that Brexit would 
make the UK permanently poorer (Campos, 2019). Moreover, Brexit is one among a constellation of 
crises inflicting upon the EU (populism, refugees, debt, unemployment, etc.). Although one among 
1 Sapir and Wolff (2016), Belke et al (2017b) and Macchiarelli (2017) discuss how progress towards the GEMU may affect 
the UK.
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many, Brexit differs in that it can alone ignite other crises. Brexit raises existential questions about the 
integration project. It asks questions about the value of membership, the dynamics and distribution of 
its benefits and costs, and the type of integration that can sustain the net benefits seen since the 1950s.
One of the few benefits of the Brexit debate is that it has fostered a flurry of new research addressing 
questions that have not been sufficiently investigated previously. One of these questions regards cohesion 
among euro area members, where the governance structure of the relationship between the countries that 
use the euro as their currency (i.e. the euro-ins) and those that do not (the euro-outs) is an important 
issue. The latter group includes both the countries that have negotiated the right to opt-out from partici-
pation under the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (the euro-outs, i.e. the UK and Denmark) and those who are 
on the path to eventual adoption of the single currency (the pre-ins, i.e. Central Eastern EU).
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a conceptual framework. It discusses the 
theory of optimal currency areas, its recent developments and the centrality of the concept of syn-
chronicity. Section 3 analyses the extent to which economic activity in the UK is synchronised with 
economic activity in the euro area and how this has changed over time—especially after the intro-
duction of the single currency. Consistent with the existing literature, we find synchronisation has 
increased after the introduction of the euro. Section 4 introduces new empirical measures of economic 
symmetry among European economies. Stability depends on the degree of integration among member 
countries or, more specifically, on the relative distance between core and periphery countries. Using 
these new measures, we show that the gap between core and periphery pre-EMU has diminished after 
the introduction of the euro and that the UK contribution was key in the sense that it moved from the 
periphery before 1990 to the core. On the other hand, the UK is also shown to be the one country in 
which this measure post-euro has varied the most (i.e. has been the least stable). Section 5 discusses 
policy implications to help increase the stability of the euro area. Section 6 concludes.
2 |  INTEGRATION, SYMMETRY AND STABILITY
Sharing a currency deepens integration. The main research question driving the optimal currency areas 
(OCA) scholarship regards the costs and benefits of sharing a currency (Alesina & Barro, 2002). The 
main cost is the loss of monetary policy autonomy. Benefits are mostly in terms of reduction of trans-
action costs and exchange rate uncertainty, and increasing price transparency, trade and competition. 
Glick and Rose (2016) summarise the econometric evidence on the trade effects of currency unions.
One insightful way of framing the OCA issue is proposed by De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005). 
They study the interactions between symmetry, flexibility and integration. The more changes in the 
levels of economic activity across countries happen in unison; that is, the more synchronised are their 
business cycles, the more integrated will countries be. Particularly, they show there exists a minimum 
combination of, for example, flexibility and integration that countries must observe for a monetary 
union to generate positive net benefits. De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) place the Eurozone (EU) 
within (to the outside) of the OCA line, suggesting those countries are (not yet) sufficiently integrated 
to generate efficiency gains that can compensate for the macroeconomic costs of the union. They also 
note how the degree of economic integration and symmetry may change over time.
Before the EMU, there was an intense debate about the extent to which a monetary union affects 
symmetry (Krugman, 1993). Focusing on the symmetry-openness dimension, one can see that in-
creased integration may raise business cycle correlation. De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005) argue the 
EU would move in this way: they predict specialisation will bring about less symmetry.
There are at least two recent developments in OCA theory that should be noted. The original OCA 
formulation stressed labour mobility, product diversification and trade openness as key adjustment 
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criteria and explored the possible endogeneity of currency unions (Arestis & Phelps, 2016; Frankel & 
Rose, 1998). Recent work calls attention to the role of credibility shocks. If there are varying degrees 
of policy commitment (furthering time inconsistency problems), countries with dissimilar credibility 
shocks should find it convenient to join a currency union (Chari, Dovis, & Kehoe, 2019). A second 
relevant recent strand highlights that, although OCA criteria are often thought of as independent, they 
should instead be considered jointly, for example, by focusing on the interactions between openness 
and mobility (Farhi & Werning, 2015).
The optimality of a currency area is a function of the distance between its members. If relative dis-
tances are large, it is common to speak of a core and periphery gap. It is expected that core countries 
would be those more closely meeting the OCA criteria (Basse, 2014; Belke, 2006). Given its impor-
tance for OCA, it is not surprising there have been various attempts of classifying countries into core 
and periphery sets. A basic way of distinguishing these methods is whether the authors pre-impose 
membership, or they allow the data to determine whether a country is a member of the core or the 
periphery at a certain point in time. Artis and Zhang (2001), for instance, investigate actual and pro-
spective membership of the EMU by applying clustering techniques to a set of variables suggested by 
OCA theory: the extent of synchronisation in business cycles (symmetry in output shocks), volatility 
in the real exchange rate, synchronisation in the real interest rate cycle, openness to trade, inflation 
convergence and labour market flexibility. Their analysis reveals that the member countries may be 
divided into three groups: those belonging to the core (Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands), those part of a Northern periphery (Denmark, Ireland, the UK, Switzerland, Sweden, 
Norway and Finland) and those belonging to a Southern periphery (Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece).
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) put forward a more theory-based approach focusing on business 
cycle synchronisation embedded in a standard Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply framework 
that classify Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark as core countries pre-EMU, 
and Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK as the pre-EMU periphery. Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1997) also offer an "optimum-currency-area index for European countries." They iden-
tify the determinants of nominal exchange rate variability, which reflect OCA characteristics and 
support predictions of which countries pertain to which sets. Conceptually, they make the point that 
OCA focuses on criteria that ultimately make exchange rates more stable and monetary unification 
less costly. In their model, bilateral exchange rate variability is a function of GDP, trade, economic 
structure dissimilarity and a measure of output synchronisation. Using 1973 to 1992 data, they find all 
these determinants carry expected signs and are of statistical significance, so they use these to forecast 
exchange rate variability in 1987, 1991 and 1995. Their econometric analysis allows three groups: in 
the first "rapidly converging" group are Germany (the numeraire), Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Ireland and Switzerland. The second group is characterised as one that has experienced little conver-
gence and is composed of the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Norway and France. The third 
group is a set of countries that are "gradually converging" to the EMU and includes Sweden, Italy, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain. They conclude that economic integration has thus increased countries" 
readiness for monetary integration (Bayoumi & Eichengreen, 1997, p. 769).
3 |  HOW INTEGRATED IS THE UK WITH THE EURO 
AREA?
During the negotiations for the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, Denmark and the UK secured an opt-out, that is, 
the right not to join the European Monetary Union (EMU). Every one of the other current 26 European 
Union members is legally committed to adopting the euro as its currency when ready (De Grauwe, 2016).
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In 1997, the new Labour government in the UK decided to reconsider the decision to stay out of the 
euro. The Treasury was charged with the policy analysis, which focused on the so-called "five tests" 
involving synchronisation of business cycles, labour mobility, investment, competitiveness of the fi-
nancial system, and growth and stability. Despite several studies showing convergence between the 
euro area and the UK (e.g. Canova, Ciccarelli, & Ortega, 2005; Giannone, Lenza, & Reichlin, 2010), 
the final verdict from the Treasury was that long-term convergence of UK and euro area business cy-
cles had not reached satisfactory levels and that "despite the risks and costs from delaying the benefits 
of joining", a decision to join was not "in the national economic interest."
Since the introduction of the euro on 1 January 1999, among the EU15 the UK and Sweden ad-
opted a free float exchange rate regime, while Denmark decided to participate in the ERM2 with the 
krona pegged to the euro. The high levels of business cycle synchronisation and a large share of ex-
ports to the euro area suggest the costs of adopting the euro remain small for Denmark (Holden, 2009).
Pesaran, Smith, and Smith (2007) provide econometric evidence, suggesting that both Sweden 
and the UK would have benefited had they joined the euro in 1999. Saia (2017) estimates trade flows 
between the UK and its main trading partners if the UK had joined the euro. He finds that that aggre-
gate flows between the UK and euro area members would have been as much as 13% higher and that 
similar results obtain for trade with non-euro area Member States.
In order to understand the extent of synchronisation between the euro area and the UK, we carry 
out a correlation analysis of the cyclical components (i.e. gap) in industrial production. Figure 1 shows 
the co-movement between the UK and euro area business cycles (Engle, 2002; Harding & Pagan, 
2006). It shows, for instance, both the consequences of the 1992 exit of the British pound from the 
F I G U R E  1  Conditional correlation: UK and euro area cycles (1990–2015).
Notes: In the figure, we generate a measure of this correlation that is conditional on cyclical features. We use the 
exponential smoother from Engle (2002) and obtain cycles using a Kalman filter (Harvey, 1989). Given possible 
structural breaks, the specification for the trend–cycle decomposition is augmented with standard interventions. To 
detect influential residuals, we use the Harvey and Koopman (1992) two-step auxiliary regression procedure. In the 
first step, the focus is on outliers and break detection. The second step involves estimating the model with those 
interventions, which were found significant in the first step.
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EMS and the 2007–09 run-up to the crisis. In line with existing studies, we find that there has been an 
overall increase in synchronisation (De Haan, Inklaar, & Jong-A-Pin, 2008). Accordingly, the average 
correlation coefficient between industrial production growth in the UK and euro for the full period 
(1991–2015) is 0.54, which is line with most of the evidence (Campos, Fidrmuc, & Korhonen, 2019), 
but it started from 0.37 in 1991–98, increased to 0.77 in 1999–2006, and again to 0.81 in 2007–2015 
during the Great Recession (Figure 1).
Our estimates show that, after the introduction of the euro, the UK and euro area business cycles 
became substantially more synchronised. This result has important and yet still poorly understood 
implications in terms of a possible exit from the EU, that is Brexit. Here, three observations are in 
order. One is that the net benefits from the increases in synchronicity since 1999 are not irreversible. 
They can be reduced by policy inconsistencies and delays, but irreversibility should not be taken for 
granted.
The second regards the consequences of this upsurge in synchronisation. Our results suggest a 
euro-out such as the UK became somehow more integrated even when not adopting the euro as its cur-
rency. All else equal, an upsurge in synchronisation leads to an increase in the net benefits of currency 
union membership and raises the costs of leaving the EU.
The third remark is this standard analysis has two main limitations. The first is that it only allows 
relative comparisons of symmetry based on individual estimates when interdependence or country 
groupings is the main issue of interest. The second is that synchronisation is an important (measur-
able) part of the explanation of symmetry adjustment within an OCA but surely not the only one.
4 |  THE STABILITY OF THE EURO AREA: FROM 
MAASTRICHT TO BREXIT
The seminal paper by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) establishes the existence of a core–periph-
ery pattern in the run-up to the EMU. Using pre-EMU data to estimate the degree of business cycle 
synchronisation, Bayoumi and Eichengreen convincingly argue that there is a core (Germany, France, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark) where supply shocks are highly correlated and a periphery 
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK) where synchronisation is significantly lower. This 
is mostly based on the degree of supply shock synchronisation as they note that demand shock correla-
tions are substantially lower, even for those countries in the "core." Yet, they consider, correctly, that 
this pattern would undermine the EMU project if persistent.
Their methodology (1993) extends the Blanchard and Quah’s (1989) procedure for decomposing 
permanent and temporary shocks. Based on the standard Aggregate Demand–Aggregate Supply (AD-
AS) model (Figure 2), supply shocks have permanent, while demand shocks have temporary effects 
on output. Both have permanent (but opposite) effects on prices. In other words, following a demand 
shock, the long-run effect on output should be zero (i.e. the economy would return to its natural rate Y), 
whereas a supply shock would instead permanently increase demand as expectations are revised and 
the short-run aggregate supply keeps shifting until Y ′′, as illustrated below.
In order to fully reflect the structure of the underlying theoretical model, we impose an addi-
tional over-identifying restriction in the VAR that captures the theoretical implication derived from 
the AS-AD model that supply shocks have permanent effects on output.
The main reason this has not been done before, we believe, is convenience. Without this addi-
tional restriction, the model is perfectly identified and can be estimated without major identification 
issues. Despite both the growth in computing power and the massive improvements in econometric 
techniques we have witnessed since the late 1980s and early 1990s, this convenient assumption has 
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remained standard in the empirical literature. Yet, this has happened at the cost of reflecting more 
fully the underlying theoretical model. Our approach precisely addresses this gap.
Adding the fifth restriction as the cornerstone of our identification strategy allows us to put for-
ward a test that produces a theory-consistent measure of the extent to which a country can be classi-
fied as periphery or core. Our indicator is the frequency with which such a hypothesis of symmetry 
is rejected.
In addition to more closely reflecting the underlying theoretical model, our approach has at least 
two other important advantages. One is that the indicator can be calculated yearly as opposed to an 
average for 10- or 20-year windows. Another advantage is that it does not depend on the adoption of 
a specific country as the numeraire (such as Germany).
The way we operationalise this idea is by first estimating a SVAR model that is fully consistent 
with Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993, 2017), in terms of lag length and identification of the demand 
shock. This means that the number of lags is set equal to Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993, 2017), as 
we want to use their results as the relevant benchmark.
Differently from the huge literature that follows Bayoumi and Eichengreen, we bootstrap the orig-
inal VAR residuals in a i.i.d. fashion and generate K = 10,000 data sets. For each, we impose an addi-
tional parameter restriction on the response of output to supply-side shocks.
As the model becomes over-identified once this restriction is imposed, this generates an over-iden-
tifying restriction test where the appropriate information criterion is a likelihood-ratio test.2
Keeping the bootstrap replications constant at 10,000, we record the number of rejections of the 
over-identifying restriction test (such that the response to a supply-side shock has a permanent effect 
on demand) and then calculate the percentage number of rejections (we call this measure NORD).
There are, of course, alternative identification schemes. For example, sign restrictions can also be 
used to identify demand and supply-side shocks. As discussed above, while we acknowledge these 
alternatives, we strive to keep Bayoumi and Eichengreen's approach as a benchmark for comparability 
of our results.3
2 We do not restrict supply shocks to have a fixed long-run value a priori. Instead, we vary this value in the interval [0.1, 2]. 
We then chose the long-run value that minimises the total number of rejections in the sample (see Campos & Macchiarelli, 
2016, 2018). Demand and supply shocks are then retrieved as the median values of structural disturbances under the chosen 
value for the over-identifying restriction.
3 We thank an anonymous referee for raising this point.
F I G U R E  2  Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply Framework [Colour figure can be viewed at 
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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In addition to trying to implement the AS-AD model more fully, another reason we adopt the 
over-identifying restriction approach is that inflation differentials are often considered a "normal fea-
ture of currency unions" (see, e.g., ECB, 2011). We pay particular attention to modelling the effect 
of permanent (supply) shocks on output, on top of the usual demand-side one. Since the proposed 
over-identifying restriction is sufficient to generate structural disturbances in line with AD-AS dy-
namics, any additional long-run restriction may be redundant in this setting.
Theoretically, testing for the "symmetry" of shocks also reflects the idea that the distinction between 
permanent and temporary shocks matters when it comes to adjustment within a currency union. According 
to De Grauwe (2016), when shocks are permanent, the slope of the usual existing trade-off between flex-
ibility and symmetry is likely to depend on the nature of the shocks. Particularly, when permanent shocks 
dominate, this trade-off is likely to be steeper. Conversely, when temporary shocks dominate, the trade-
off will be flatter. We extend this idea further and suggest that it is not only the nature of the shock that 
matters but also the direction and extent by which shocks are pushing an economy "out of sync."4
The test (and the indicator we calculate from it) is interpreted as that the lower (higher) the percent-
age of rejections, the more a country is said to be part of the centre (periphery).
In order to quantify how countries have become entrenched since the euro, or to put it differently 
to assess whether the EMU has strengthened or weakened the core–periphery divide, we first revisit 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) using the same sample and time window (25 years) to extend and 
replicate their results for 1989–2015, yet using the estimation approach explained above (i.e. with the 
additional restriction).
Our results suggest that the introduction of the euro weakened the original core–periphery pattern 
and even countries not using the euro as their currency have become progressively more synchronous 
(Figure 3).5 These results broadly confirm the endogenous OCA hypothesis (Frankel & Rose, 1998). 
Note also that comparing pre- and post-EMU in Figure 3 reveals that although the range on the de-
mand side remains the same, it has increased in terms of the supply shocks (with minimum values of 
−0.7 after as opposed to −0.3 before).
Our approach allows us to track how the core and the periphery changed over time. The distance 
between the core and the periphery could well have increased post-EMU. The periphery could have 
fully converged with the core, or it could have moved towards the core, or both could have moved to-
wards each other. The asymmetry could also have decreased by core and periphery converging by 
large changes in demand and small changes in supply correlations or the other way around.6 Actually, 
4 One concern is the possible effects from any regime changes between 1960 and 2015. Using a dummy saturation approach, 
first proposed by Hendry et al. (2008), Johansen and Nielsen (2009), we attempt to detect model selection problems and 
correct the original series for possible regime changes. In the light of the above, we generally identify three regimes for both 
GDP and inflation, broadly consistent across countries: 1960:I-1969:I; 1984:I-1992:I; and 2008:I-2015:I. These results are 
available upon request from the authors.
5 Here, one could argue that non-parametric methods provide a useful alternative since they could be used to determine 
unknown trends, while not relying on any specific functional form. For instance, a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression 
of ΔY on , would display a graph of the smoothed values of GDP growth, making no assumptions about the functional form 
(Cerqueira, 2013; Cerqueira & Martins, 2009). However, as we are interested in the impact on demand purely from a 
supply-side shock, the structural identification of the shocks is a crucial step (Bayoumi & Eichengreen 1992, 1997; Campos & 
Macchiarelli 2016, 2018). This results in a reduced two-variable model that is represented by a moving average process.
6 A high business cycle correlation is often seen as a key criterion for an optimum integration area. However, it can be argued 
that the elasticity with which countries react to the “common cycle” is equally important. This raises the possibility that the 
main problem might not be a de-synchronisation of business cycles, for instance, between core and periphery, but instead that 
individual countries have cycles that are tightly correlated, but of very different amplitudes, thus sometimes requiring 
different policies at the peak than at the trough (Belke et al 2017a).
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we find that the periphery experienced a decrease in demand correlations and an increase in supply, 
while the core experienced a decrease in both.
For the EU12, we find that the periphery is composed of Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain, 
while the core contains the UK, Denmark, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy. Our 
results are comparable with the results that Bayoumi and Eichengreen and others have produced for 
the pre-EMU period (Di Giorgio, 2016). This snapshot covers the post-EMU period but says little 
about such dynamics evolved over time.
Using this methodology and conditioning the first sample to 1960–85, we can generate a time-vary-
ing measure, estimated, each time, on a fixed 25-year window (see Appendix A for details). In Figure 4, 
higher (lower) values of the index indicate a higher probability of a country being classified as periph-
ery (core). The results suggest that while Germany has been safely below the threshold, the UK has 
been moving in and out of the core (using a 50% admittedly arbitrary cut-off). This is not surprising 
ex-post and consistent with the (summary) of previous business cycle synchronisation analyses.
We identify three groups of countries (Figure 4): a core that becomes more homogenous over time; 
a periphery that changes little over time; and a mixed set of countries with interesting trajectories—
the index for Denmark is almost constant, Greece and Sweden becomes systematically less core over 
time, Spain becomes systematically more core over time, and the UK is in and out of the core set of 
countries.
In order to understand the dynamics of this measure, we consider a set of variables suggested by 
OCA theory. We examine four main groups of possible explanatory variables: fiscal (debt-to-GDP 
ratio, cyclically adjusted budget balance), financial (corporate bond spread, 10-year government bond 
spread, 3-month interbank interest rate spread, interest on the average on consumer loan spread, return 
F I G U R E  3  The dynamics of the correlation of supply and demand disturbances between pre-EMU (1963–88) 
and post-EMU (1991–2015).
Notes: The figure compares estimates from pre-Maastricht based on Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), covering the 
period 1963–88, with Campos and Macchiarelli (2016) equivalent estimates for the period 1991–2015 (post-EMU). 
For each country, a bivariate SVAR is estimated using (log) real GDP and the (log) deflator, both in first differences. 
The structural identification of the shocks also follows Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) and controls for changes 
in regimes. Red arrows denote movements of the so-called "core" countries, and blue arrows, movements of the 
"periphery."
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on equity differential, a set that is consistent with the European Central Bank's definition of financial 
integration, ECB, 2011), external (FDI and real effective real exchange rate), structural reforms (em-
ployment protection legislation, EPL, and product market regulation, PMR) and a dummy variable on 
euro area membership.
The estimation includes, besides the UK, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, as well as EU non-euro area countries such 
as Sweden and non-EU countries such as Switzerland and Norway. We present the results for the pe-
riod 1991–2015, but these are robust when we stop our estimation before the financial crisis in 2007.
In order to address possible endogeneity problems, we use a GMM approach where the weighting 
matrix is set to equal the 2SLS. The results are qualitatively the same if instead we use a Huber/Eicker/
White heteroscedasticity-robust variance–covariance matrix (these are available upon request from 
the authors). In the estimation, the number of endogenous variables equals the number of instruments, 
where the instruments are selected to be the lagged dependent variables, plus the constant and the 
Eurozone (EZ) membership dummy.
The overall results (last column in Table 1) suggest that a strong role is played by the strictness 
of product market regulation whereby a high PMR increases the likelihood of country being in the 
periphery. This is in turn not surprising given that the index is based on supply-side dynamics and 
the extent to which those prompt similar GDP reactions among Member States. A second factor is 
the level of debt-to-GDP, again, in reducing the likelihood of a country being in the core, albeit the 
statistical evidence is not strong.
Membership to the currency union, for the countries in our sample, suggests an important role in 
making countries less "peripheral", impacting the probability of being classified as periphery by as 
much as 16 percentage points (Figure 4).
These findings are in line with the idea that one of the main concerns for monetary union member-
ship would be represented by the costs of adjustment in order to deal with asymmetries. In the absence 
of sufficient labour flexibility, and equally of fiscal transfers at the euro area level, many countries 
would suffer from severe adjustment problems.
F I G U R E  4  Measuring the probability of a country being classified as periphery over time.
Notes: The figure compares our measure of persistence (NORD) across countries from a SVAR estimated using 
(log) real GDP and the (log) deflator in first difference, as explained in the Annex. The first sample is 1960–85. The 
measure we obtain is estimated, each time, on a fixed 25-year window and 2 lags.
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Debt (% GDP) 0.109**       0.112*
(0.041)       (0.131)
Adj. budget balance (% potential 
output)
0.812*       0.681
(0.334)       (1.121)
Corporate bond spread   0.390     0.616
  (0.570)     (0.717)
Gvt bond spread   0.905     −2.768
  (0.733)     (1.841)
3-month interbank spread   −4.497**     −1.317
  (1.321)     (2.128)
Avg on consumer loan spread   −0.114     0.478
  (0.425)     (0.709)
Return on equity diff.   0.642     −0.516
  (0.409)     (0.387)
         
FDI (%GDP)     −0.474***   −0.491
    (0.150)   (0.208)
Reer (CPI adj.)     −0.249**   −0.280
    (0.117)   (0.291)
         
EPL       −14.148* −25.358
      (5.905) (19.894)
PMR       10.345** 14.481***
      (3.539) (5.348)
         
EZ membership −19.070*** −27.234*** −12.098*** −11.662*** −16.978***
(2.085) (2.846) (1.919) (2.913) (5.591)
         
C 71.079*** 84.165*** 99.192*** 89.086*** 135.646**
(6.591) (5.161) (13.024) (15.513) (57.111)
Effect Random Random Random Random Fixed
Adj R2 0.183 −0.038 0.078 0.193 0.701
Durbin–Watson 0.551 0.908 0.527 0.703 1.275
J-Stat (p-value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Note: '*,**,***' denote significance at the 1 5 and 10 percent, respectively. In the table, our measure of persistence (NORD) is regressed 






















 = fiscal (debt-to-GDP ratio, cyclically 
adjusted budget balance), X
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 = financial (corporate bond spread, 10-year government bond spread, 3-month interbank interest rate spread, 
interest on the average on consumer loan spread, return on equity differential, a set that is consistent with the European Central Bank's 
definition of financial integration, ECB, 2011), (c) X
3it
 = external (FDI and real effective real exchange rate), X
4it
 = structural reforms 
(employment protection legislation, EPL, and product market regulation, PMR). In all columns, a constant term and a dummy variable on 
euro area membership are included. In the GMM estimation, the number of endogenous variables equals the number of instruments, where 
the instruments are selected to be the lagged dependent variables, plus the constant and the Eurozone (EZ) membership dummy.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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5 |  DISCUSSION
Even before the launch of the EMU, the concern about entrenched asymmetries spurred an alterna-
tive approach to European integration: the possibility of a two-tier or "multi-speed Europe." From an 
economic viewpoint, it is true that smaller groups of countries may be better candidates for forming 
an OCA given that they may be more homogenous (see also De Grauwe, 2016). Looking at the early 
evidence on the degree of synchronisation of shocks across countries before the EMU (1963–88), 
compared to the same pattern 25 years after the EMU, however, suggest that a new, smaller, periphery 
has emerged (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece). Thus, the EMU has weakened the core–periphery 
pattern, resulting in countries being more integrated over time.
The UK, with its mixed experience shown above, represents a much lesser threat to euro area 
stability than the absence of concerted and forceful action from euro area Member States themselves. 
This is particularly true if Brexit occurs in an orderly and gradual manner. In this respect, we argue 
that while the hypothesis of a "multi-tier" Europe cannot be dismissed on the basis of the available 
evidence, our results support the view that a viable alternative to a "multi-speed" scenario is a serious 
process of coordinated reform. This is indeed the spirit of the Five Presidents’ Report (Junker, Tusk, 
Dijsselbloem, Draghi, & Schulz, 2015).
As mentioned above, there has been considerable thinking and planning on how to make the EMU 
more effective, that is how to ensure the stability and integrity of the EMU. The first clear attempt 
at addressing this matter was the so-called Four Presidents’ Report (those of the European Council, 
European Commission, European Central Bank and Eurogroup) that in 2012 put forward as an explicit 
goal the need to move towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union (Macchiarelli, 2016). The 
choice of words (i.e. Genuine) is indicative of the extent of the consensus about the need for EMU re-
form. The Five Presidents’ 2015 report provides a roadmap for further deepening of the EMU in order 
to ensure the stability and smooth functioning of the EMU. It stipulates a detailed range of actions and 
a clear timetable (in three phases) to bring progress in four main areas, namely economic, financial, 
fiscal and political union.
Our analysis documents that the introduction of the single currency preceded a substantial increase 
in symmetry among Member States, thus improving an important dimension in most considerations 
about the stability of the euro area. The main policy implications we derive hence complement those 
put forward by the Five Presidents’ Report. This Report indicates what is to be done and when, while 
our analysis suggests countries that should receive special attention in order for these policy actions 
to be more effective.
Our results suggest Sweden is a crucial country in order to fulfil the goal of increasing the stability 
of the euro area. After the UK, the trajectory of Sweden's index since 1990 is worrisome. It indicates 
that this is one of the few countries that continue to leave (or it continues to increase its distance from) 
the core and has done so in a systematic and sustained way. No other country exhibits such a trajectory. 
Moreover, Sweden is an important trade partner to the Baltics, which also show surprisingly (despite 
their euro membership and relatively low levels of product market regulation) to have large distances 
from the core. Third and finally, without the UK (post-Brexit), Sweden will become the country closer 
to the border with the periphery. For all these reasons, the EU should focus on Sweden to foster the 
stability of the euro.
The Swedish Statistical Office monitors public opinion towards the single currency, and the levels 
of rejection have been above 70% in recent years. Yet, there is a clear economic explanation for this. 
Campos, Coricelli, and Moretti (2016) argue that Sweden benefited relatively little from EU mem-
bership after it joined in 1995 (in large part because it was already a high-income country with highly 
developed institutions) and benefited substantially from avoiding joining the euro (partly because its 
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largest trading partners are not Eurozone members). Indeed, the evidence suggests that while around 
year 2000 the benefits from not joining were relatively difficult to estimate (or close to zero), a decade 
later these have become substantial and significant (Gyoerk, 2017).
In terms of the actual UK withdrawal from the EU, Brexit will certainly challenge both internal and 
external equilibria, with some EU non-euro area Member States such as Poland, Denmark and indeed 
Sweden, but also the "pre-ins", feeling they will lose grip in shaping Eurozone policies (Oliver, 2016), 
especially against an enhanced role of Germany and the other euro area Member States. This may trig-
ger further scepticism, should the EMU fail to provide an attractive alternative model for integration. 
We argue that deeper integration should carry on to the point of making euro-outs be eager to join, as 
anticipated in phase 3 of the Five Presidents’ Report.
6 |  CONCLUSIONS
What is the impact of Brexit on the stability of the euro area? This paper argues that if one is con-
cerned about stability and cohesion, asymmetry and imbalances, one way of thinking about these 
issues is offered by the notion of the probability of a country being classified as periphery in a core 
and periphery framework.
Before Maastricht, the seminal contribution of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) generated a clear 
picture. Looking at correlations between demand and supply shocks, one could see two distinct groups 
of countries: a core and a periphery. It is a seminal paper because, inter alia, it is one of the first to 
point out the risks of an entrenched core–periphery to the then-nascent EMU. Their influential diag-
nostics was based on data covering 25 years from 1963 to 1988. Using the same methodology, sample 
and time window, we replicate and extend their results for 1989–2015. We ask whether the EMU 
strengthened or weakened the core–periphery pattern. Our results suggest the EMU has weakened 
the original pattern; that is, the number of countries in the periphery (core) decreased (increased). 
How did these groups (core and periphery) change over time? We find the UK belongs to a mixed set 
of countries. While Denmark's index is basically flat, that is it changes little over time, Greece and 
Sweden become systematically less integrated over time, while Spain shows the opposite pattern. 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, the UK goes in and out of the core.
Finally, we ask the question of what drives symmetry (and thus stability). Our estimates show 
that euro membership and Product Market Regulation are key. We find the probability of a country 
of being classified as core is driven chiefly by euro membership and product market regulation. This 
finding provides renewed and direct support for the endogenous OCA hypothesis and its interpretation 
in a broader sense.
In terms of future research, our analysis identifies at least four main fruitful areas. One is incorpo-
rating more EU member countries so as to provide a fuller picture of the behaviour of the core and of 
the periphery over time. This should be also useful to assess the more recent experience of accession 
to the euro area and inform the policies of various EU Member States that are considering joining. 
The second is that future research would benefit from a regional-level perspective, complementing the 
country-level one. Third, this paper and the majority of the scholarship that precedes it focus on the 
real side, not on the monetary. Future research would do well to bring in the financial sector and study 
how it interacts with the real sector in this framework and what sort of policy implications can be 
derived from such an analysis. Fourth, and specifically related to future research on the stability of the 
euro and Brexit, the features of the trade agreement should come into play in the future when conduct-
ing similar research stressing trade and financial integration in addition to business cycle correlations.
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APPENDIX A
TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE SYMMETRY MEASURE
In what follows, we summarise the methodology used to construct our measure of summery. The 
underlying methodology is that of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), which is an extension of the 
Blanchard and Quah (1989) procedure for decomposing permanent and temporary shocks.
Let us consider a system where the true model is represented by an infinite moving average of a 
(vector) of variables, Xt, and shocks, t. Using the lag operator L, a bivariate VAR featuring real GDP 






 and the matrices A represent the impulse response functions of the shocks to the 
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where yt and pt represent the logarithm of output and prices, and t are i.i.d. disturbances, which identify 
supply and demand shocks (Ramey 2016, forthcoming). For the ith country, a
11i represents element a11, 
in matrix Ai and so on.
This framework implies that supply shocks have permanent effects on output, while demand shocks 
have temporary effects. Both have permanent (opposite) effects on prices. The cumulative effect of 
demand shocks on the change in output must be zero:
The system can be estimated using a VAR. Each element can be regressed on lagged values of all 
the elements of X. Using B to represent these estimated coefficients:
where et represents the residuals from the VAR equations. Using the standard relation between the VAR’s 
residuals (et) and structural disturbances—that is demand and supply shocks—that is et =Ct, it is clear 
that, for each country, the exact identification of the C matrix requires four restrictions. Two are normal-
isations, which define the variance of the shocks dt and st. The third restriction is from assuming that 
demand and supply shocks are orthogonal to each other. The fourth is that demand shocks have only 
temporary effects on output.
The standard AD-AS model implies that demand shocks should raise prices in both the short and 
long run, while supply shocks should lower prices and increase demand permanently. In order to 
achieve that, it suffices to impose the additional over-identifying restriction in the VAR that sup-
ply shocks have permanent effects on output. We need to impose this restriction in our sample for 
the demand and supply shocks to be theory-consistent. This differs from Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
(1993) because they do not impose this last restriction, which leaves the model exactly identified. 
One reason we adopt the proposed over-identifying restriction is that inflation differentials are often 
considered a "normal feature of currency unions." Therefore, we pay particular attention to modelling 
the effect of shocks on demand. The role of co-movements in output's cyclical fluctuations is further 
in line with the business cycle literature. Since the proposed over-identifying restriction is sufficient 
to get structural disturbances in line with AD-AS dynamics, any additional long-run restriction may 
be redundant in this setting.




12i = , where 𝛾 >0. Under the 
latter assumption, demand across each country is restricted to respond qualitatively (sign) and quanti-
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We do not restrict  a priori; instead, we vary  in the interval [0.1, 2]. The value we chose to report, 
consistent with Campos and Macchiarelli (2016), is  =1.
In order to construct a test for the over-identifying restriction described above, we estimate the 
SVAR model consistent with Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). Differently from the latter, we boot-
strap the original VAR residuals in a i.i.d. fashion and generate K = 10,000 data sets. For each of the 
kth samples, we proceed with a structural analysis and test for the over-identifying restriction based on 
a LR test. We record the number of rejections of the over-identifying restriction test at each bootstrap 
replication, and calculate:
where Lu and Lr are the maximised values of the (Gaussian) log-likelihood function of the unrestricted 
and restricted regressions, respectively. Under H
0
, the lr statistic has an asymptotic distribution with de-




∕2, where n is the var 
dimension (in this case, n=2).
The dynamic version of the index is obtained by letting T be larger than before where  denote the 
width of a subsample or window and define the rolling sample "metrics." Here, we define:
The windows are rolled through the sample one observation at a time, so there the procedure returns 
T −+1 rolling estimates of the NORD (Campos & Macchiarelli, 2016, 2018).
The basic intuition for our NORD measure is that it reflects the percentage of times we observe the 
rejection of the key restrictions needed to estimate the Aggregate Demand–Aggregate Supply model. 
The higher the percentage of rejections (or the more often they happen), the higher is the value of 
NORD. As such, NORD values range between 0 (perfect, the probability of a country of being clas-
sified as periphery content) and 100 (i.e. the probability of a country of being classified as periphery 
content implying a perfect periphery).
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